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As a contribution to the mathematics of the philosophy of psy- 
chology, explicate are obtained for (1) the net amount of deciding 
contained in a mental event, F, in favor of an act or of a class of 
acts; (2) the deeisionary effort contained in F, with respect to a class 
of acts. 
I t  is found, for example, that much deciding can be clone effort- 
lessly, and on the other hand a small amount of deciding can con- 
sume a lot of effort. 
A by-product of the discussion is a contribution to the axiomaties 
of what Kullback calls the "divergence" between two probability 
distributions. 
The meanings of "decision" and "conclusion" are briefly con- 
sidered. 
My purpose throughout is clarification only, not specific appli- 
cation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I n  this paper  I shall t ry  to give quant i ta t ive  meaning to "deciding." 
I am not sure to what  extent the work is a contr ibut ion to statist ics,  
to the theory  of rat ional i ty ,  to psychology, or to the "mathemat ics  of 
phi losophy."  Some will say that  it is metaphysica l ,  but. I do not  th ink 
it  is more so than Freud ian  or Jungian psychology. A stat ist ic ian o 
longer needs to apologize for philosophizing. 
One of the functions of phi losophy is to define words that  are too 
difficult for the makers  of dictionaries. Sometimes this leads to scientific 
advances. As F reud  said "A definition is a theory."  Of special interest  
to current  stat ist ics is the decision process. Tukey  (1960), for example, 
complained that  no adequate  definition of a decision has been given in 
the l i terature.  Accordingly this paper  begins with one possible definition. 
I t  is more difficult, and more interesting, to consider the actual  
process of deciding. Most  of the paper  is concerned with what  meanings 
can be given to: 
(i) The  net amount  of deciding, contained in a menta l  event, F, in 
favor of an act, E, or a class, E, of acts. 
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(2) The  deeisionary effort in F with respect to a class, E, of acts. 
The  definitions are arrived at by first laying down "desiderata." 
They  are expressed in terms of the "credibilities" of E, when what  is 
"given" is all the evidence available to the decider at any given moment ,  
including his own state of mind. 
I find the definitions satisfying bu~ I do not wish to be dogmatic 
about them. 
II. "DECISIONS AND CONCLUSIONS" 
The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the process of deciding, 
rather than decisions as such, but it will help to clear the ground to 
begin by defining a "decision." 
When, in some sense, the probability that a man will perform an ac~, 
E, becomes great, assuming no interference from outside, then we say 
that the man has decided to perform this act, or that he has reached a
decision. The probability must be in the light of evidence available to 
the man himself: we would not say that a man had decided to leave a 
Public House if only we knew that he was shortly to be ejected, although 
some people might claim that he had unconsciously decided to leave! 
Since no empiricM probability can be equal to 1, a decision can be 
reversed at any time before the act E is performed. If the man thinks 
that the probability is exactly 1 he would be wrong: he only thinks he 
has made an irrevocable decision. The probability in the above definition 
must be taken not as an actual degree of belief, but as a rational degree 
of belief, otherwise known as a rational intensity of conviction, or 
simply as a "credibility." 
The peculiarity of the process of deciding, regarded as an example of 
probability determination, is that the subject simultaneously estimates 
the subjective probability, determines the credibility, and affects the 
physical probability, of an event. The "given" evidence includes the 
state of mind of the decider; in fact, quite often in the process of reaching 
a decision, the only relevant evidence that varies is this state of mind. 
When a decision is reached and not reversed we can retrospectively 
say that the decision was made at the time at which the credibility 
last reached some conventional high value, such as 0.99. It is often not 
easy to estimate this moment; for example, when a man signs a contract 
all that we can be sure of is that he made the decision at some moment 
preceding the signing. In the game of chess, on the other hand, the de- 
cision to make a move can hardly precede the action by a long period 
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of time, otherwise the player would simply be wastiug time on his own 
clock. In both these examples, the moment at which the decision be- 
comes overtly clear is when it becomes costly to reverse it. 
A conclusion is a decision in which the act E is itself a mental event, 
usually the acceptance for the time being of a hypothesis. By conven- 
tion, we may assume that the hypothesis does not simply state that 
one act is better than another! 
Tukey (1960) said that there ought to be a conclusion theory as 
well as a decision theory. I would agree with him i~'1 resisting the con- 
quest of the whole of statistics by "decision theory" if by this expression 
is meant a theory in which all possible actions have to be listed in ad- 
vance of experimentation r observation. But this is not what I per- 
sonally mean by a theory of rational decisions or behaviour. [See, for 
example, Good (1950, 1952, 1961) and Smith (1961).] In fact, in order 
to emphasize that such a theory should cover conclusions just as much 
as any other decisions, I now prefer the name theory of rationality. 
I t  could be argued that the conclusion of accepting a hypothesis is 
liable to have unknown effects in the future. But this is also true of any 
other decision. To say that we need a theory of conclusions as well as a 
theory of rationality would be like saying that we need geometry as 
well as mathematics. We need a theory of rationality, with special atten- 
tion to a theory of conclusions, and to a theory of values. But this is 
somewhat of a digression. 
Having cleared the ground, I now come to the main content of the 
paper, which is a quantitative discussion of the actual process of making 
a decision. 
I I I .  NET AMOUNT OF DECID ING IN FAVOR OF A SINGLE ACT 
Let us first consider what quantitative meaning might be ascribed to 
the net amount of deciding in favor of an act E contained in a mental 
event F. I shall denote the amount by A(E:F)  and assume that it is a 
real function of the two probabilities, p = P(E)  and q = P(EIF  ). 
As stated before, these probabilities are supposed to be credibilities 
based on all the evidence available to the decider. A measure of a de- 
cision, especially an overt one, might be said to depend also on the cost 
of reversing the decision, but I here propose to ignore costs as in most 
of the work in the theory of information. Accordingly I shall write 
A(E:F)  = A(p; q), 
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so that the symbol A has two slightly different meanings. This double 
use can hardly give rise to confusion. 
Since we are trying now to define the amount of deciding in favor of E, 
we shall permit, it to have negative as well as positive values. It is nat- 
ural to insist that, as a first desideratum, 
(i) A(p;q) > 0, when q>p.  (1) 
As a second desideratum, let us assume the additive property: 
(ii) A(E:F1.F2) = A(E:F~) q-A(E:F2[F~), (2) 
where the dot denotes logical conjunction and the vertical stroke im- 
plies that the relevant probabilities are made conditional on Ft. This 
desideratum ay be written 
a(p; r) = ~(p; q) + a(q; r). (3) 
In words: the total net amount of deciding in favor of an act, when 
its probability is changed, depends only on the initial and final prob- 
abilities. It  implies that negative amounts can cancel positive amounts, 
and in particular that 
A~p;p) = 0 (4) 
and 
~(p; q) = -A(q; p). (5) 
As a third and final desideratum for A we select an additivity property 
when the act E is expressed as a conjunction of two acts, namely: 
(iii) A(Et.E2:F) = A(E~:F) -t- A(E2:F), (6) 
if E1 and E2 are statistically independent whether or not F is given. 
We could have assumed the more general additivity condition 
A(E~.E2:F) -~ A(/~:F)  ~-A(E2:FIE~), (7) 
where E~ and E: are not necessarily independent; but it turns out that 
(7) is implied by our other assumptions. 
From desideratum (ii) it follows (Appendix I) that A(p; q) is of the 
form ~o(q) -- ~o(p), where ~0 is some absolute real function; and from 
desideratum (iii) it follows (Appendix II) that this function is a loga- 
rithm, at any rate if A(p; q) is a measm'able function. Desideratum (i) 
shows that the base of the logarithms must exceed 1. Its choice merely 
determines the unit of measurement. 
DECID ING AND DECIS IONARY EFFORT 275 
We have therefore arrived at the definition 
A(E:F)  = tog[P(E]F)/P(E)] (8) 
for the net amount of deciding in favor of E contained in F. Since the 
total initial evidence available to the decider is taken for granted (and 
omitted from the notation) it follows that, if E comes earlier than F, then 
the net amount of deciding in F in favor of E is zero. (This is on the 
assumption that it is "given" that the past is unchangeable.) So, 
although we originally assumed E to come later than F, our definition 
makes sense even if it is earlier. 
In one of the notations of information theory, we may write 
~(E :F )  = I (E :F ) ,  (9} 
the amount of information concerning E provided by F (which is: 
equal to that concerning F provided by E).  Condition (7) is therefore 
equivalent to a known, and easily proved, property of "amount of in- 
formation." (Cf., for example, Good, 1955.) 
IV. YECTOR AMOUNT OF DECIDING IN FAVOR OF A CLASS OF ACTS 
Suppose now that we have an exhaustive class of mutually exclusive 
acts, E l ,  E~, . . .  , E~, where P(Ei)  = p~, P(Ei lF ) = q~ (i = 1, 2, 
• .. , n). Then it is natural to define the vector amount of deciding in 
favor of this class, contained in a mental event F, as 
A(E~, . . -  ,EGF)  = A(E:F)  
= A(p~,  . . .  ,p~ ;q~,  . . .  ,%)  = A(p ;q )  (10)  
= { log(q~/pd} = {: (Z~:F)} .  
This definition leads at once to the properties: 
A(p;q)  = 0 if and only if p = q, (11) 
A(p; q) = --A(q; p), (12) 
A(p; r) = a(p;  q) + A(q; r). (13) 
Equation (13) shows that A(p; q) can be regarded as a vector diver- 
gence between the two distributions p and q. For a continuous dis- 
tribution, having a density function that is changed from u(x) to v(z) 
by the event F, the vector amount of deciding is now naturally de- 
fined as the function 
log[v(x)/u(x)], (14) 
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and greater generality could be obtained, if required, by means of the 
Radon-Nikodym theorem. 
V. THE ZERO-ORDER APPROXIMATION TO THE DECISIONARY 
EFFORT WITH RESPECT TO A CLASS OF ACTS 
Velocity is a vector, speed is a scalar. Slightly analogously we can 
disth~guish between the vector A(E :F ) 'and a scalar D(E:F) ,  which 
will represent the dec is ionary  effort  with respect o E contained in F. 
If F is a vacillating mental event lasting some time, and if the final 
distribution q is the same as the initial one p, then we would not expect 
the decisionary effort to vanish, although the vector amount of deciding 
does vanish. In order to arrive at an explicatum for D(E:F) ,  we shall 
first introduce an approximation, Do(E :F ) ,  in which only p and q 
are taken into account, and the h is tory  of the distribution throughout 
the duration of F is ignored. We may call D0(E:F) the "zero-order 
approximation to the decisionary effort in F with respect o E." 
We wish then first to assign a definition to 
Do(E1 ,  . . "  , E~:F )  = D0(E:F) 
= Do(p1 ,  " "  , p,~ ;q l ,  " "  , q,~) = Do(p; q). 
Let us assume the following desiderata: 
(i) D0(p; p) = 0, Do(p; q) => 0. (15) 
(ii) The contributions of E1, E2, . ' .  , E~ to D0(E:F) are additive, 
i.e., there is a function ¢(x, y), continuous when 0 < x < 1, 0 < y < 1, 
such that 
D0(v; q) = (16) 
The chief justification of this assumption is its simplicity. For mathe- 
matical convenience in solving a functional equation, I shall assume 
that ~ is analytic although our expficatum could probably be deduced, 
with more difficulty, without this extra assumption. 
(iii) If G1, G2, - . .  , G~ are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, and 
have "nothing to do" with Ex nor with F, then 
Do(E~.G~,  . . .  , E~.G~,  E2 ,  . . . ,  E ,~:F )  = D0(E:E). (17) 
(iv) The sum of the zero-order approximations to the decisionary 
efforts in two separate decisions having nothing to do with one another 
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is equal to that of the joint decision. Symbolically, 
Do(p; q) ~- Do(p'; q') (18) 
= Do(pip1', pip2 p, " "  , p~p./ ;  qlqi I, ' ' "  , q~q,,'), 
where 
P' = (pl', "'" , pro'), q' : (q l ' ,  " ' "  , qm')* 
(Only the case n = m = 2 will be required.) 
Desideratum (iii), identity (17), leads to 
•(X]kl , y~ l )  -~ " ' "  -~- ~(X~s, y]k~) = ~(X, y), (19)  
whenever  
Xl + "'" -~- X~ = 1, Xl => O, " "  ,X~-> O. 
This can be shown (Appendix I I I)  to imply that the function e is of 
the form 
~(x,  y) = (y -- x)~b(y/x) .  (20) 
If we take ¢(x) = A + B log x, where A and B are constants, then 
(18) is easily seen to be satisfied, and in fact this form is necessary as 
well as sufficient (Appendix IV). The fact of sufficiency is, mathemati- 
cally, already known (Kullback, 1959, p. 23.) The constant A does not 
affect the explieatum, and B can be absorbed into the logarithmic base. 
If this is done, the base must exceed unity, in virtue of desideratum (i). 
Thus the suggested efinition of the zero-order approximation to the 
decisionary effort of F with respect o the exhaustive mutually exclusive 
acts ,  -~'1,  " ' "  , En, is 
D0(E:F) = D0(p; q) = ~'~ (q~ -- p~)log(q~/p~). (21) 
This is what Kullback (1959) calls the "divergence" between the two 
distributions p and q, although in the present context it would be better 
to call it the "scalar divergence" in order to distinguish it from the 
"vector divergence," ( I (E~: F) }. 
For a continuous distribution, having a density function that is 
changed from u(x)  to v(x)  by the event F, the zero-order approximation 
to the decisionary effort is naturally taken as 
f (v (x )  -- u (x )  ) log[v (x ) /u (x ) ]  dx. (22) 
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Generally, the definition is the difference between the expected "weights 
of evidence" per observation (Good, 1950) when discriminating be- 
tween two hypotheses, when one is true and when the other is true. 
VI. THE DECISIONARY EFFORT WITH RESPECT TO A CLASS OF ACTS 
If we wish to take into account he duration of the mental event F 
say from t = to to t = T, it will simplify matters if we assume the 
background evidence to remain unchanged throughout. Thus any 
changes in the probabilities of the Ei's are due to gradual completion 
of the mental event F. (It would be easy to modify the discussion to 
take changes in the background evidence into account.) 
In view of the additive property (13) the vector amount of deciding 
in favour of E, during any time interval, is equal to the sum of the 
amounts over any enumerable set of abutting subintervals. But matters 
are quite different for the zero-order approximation to the decisionary 
effort with respect o the class of events. 
Suppose that p~ is a function of t, denoted by p~(t )  ( i  = 1, 2,  • • • , n ;  
to <- t -< T), and denote the vector {p~(t)} by p(t). (The corresponding 
discussion when i is replaced by a continuous random variable x pre- 
sents no new difficulties and will be omitted. Formula (27) below, for 
example, would be replaced by a double integral.) 
As t increases from to to T, the distribution p(t) may sometimes change 
' ! : .  () 
discontinuously. Let us suppos6 that there are at most an enumerable 
number of discontinuities, r l ,  ~-2, " -  
Now dissect he closed interval [to, T] into an enumerable number of 
nonoverlapping and abutting intervals, [ t j ,  tJ] (j = 1, 2 , . . - )  such 
that the points r l ,  r21 "'" never fall at points of dissection. (ti+l need 
not be equal to t / ,  in fact the ordering of the subintervals i  immaterial.) 
We then naturally defil~e the decisionary effort with respect o E, con- 
tained in F, as 
D(E :F )  = lim~-~. ~ [p~(t'j) -- p~(tj)] log [p i ( t ' j ) /p~( t j ) ] ,  (23) 
i=1 ]~1 
the limit being taken as the "fineness" (maximum length of any sub- 
interval) of the dissection tends to zero. This limit can be expressed as 
~i~e sum of two parts corresponding to the expression of p(t) as the sum 
of a vector step function s(t) and ~ continuous function z(t). The con- 
tribution from the step function is 
i 
+ o)  - - o ) ]  log  + - o ) ] ,  (24)  
• = i  k~l  
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and the contribution from the continuous function is 
lim ~ ~ [z~(t'j) - zi(tj)] log [zi(t'j)/z~(ts)]. (25) 
i~i i=l 
This second limi~ is zero if z(t) has a continuous derivative throughout 
It0, T]. If, on the other hand, z~(t) is, for each i, a realization of a general- 
ized Brownian motion for which 
[z~(t + at) - z~(t)] ~ = J~( t )  at + o(dt), (26)  
then the second limit is 
f r  ~r~2(t) dt 
~o ~(ti " (27) 
We therefore arrive at the following deduction from our desiderata: 
The decisionary effort D(E :F )  arises partly from instants at which 
p(t) is discontinuous and partly from the rest of the interval, such as 
when p(t) behaves like a Brownian motion; but there is no contribution 
from instants at which the derivative of p(t) is continuous. If the deriva- 
tive is continuous throughout the interval, then D(E :F )  -- 0; a smooth 
decision is effortless. We may speculate that, when E represents all the 
acts for which F is relevant, then D(E :F) is a measure of the tendency 
of F to produce a nervous breakdown. We might then shorten the nota- 
tion to D(F)  and define the pleasure in F, qua decision, as 
X(T -- to) -- D(F ) ,  (28) 
where X is a constant. 
Although, in the above discussion, F is described as a mental event, 
it will often reveal itself to some extent in overt behavior as, for ex- 
ample, when a chess-player's hand hovers in quasi-Brownian motion 
over the board. Jerky thinking is liable to give rise to jerky behavior. 
The debate between the subdemons of the mind can be either peaceful 
or violent. 
R~CmVED: April 18, 1961 
~EFERENCES 
GOOg, I. J. (1950). "Probability and the Weighing of Evidence." Charles Griffin, 
London. 
GooD, I. J. (1952). Rational decisions. J. Roy. Slatisl. Soc. B14, 107-114. 
GOOD, I. J. (1956). Some terminology and notation in information theory. Proc. 
%nsl. Elec. Engrs. 103, Pt. C (3), 200-204. 
280 GOOD 
GOOD, I. J. (1960). Weight of evidence, corroboration, explanatory power, infor- 
mation, and the utility of experiments, J. Roy. Statist. Soc. B22, 319-331. 
GOOD, I. J. (1961). Subiective probability as the measure of a non-measurable 
set. Intern. Congr. for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Sci., 1960, Stan- 
ford University. 
HANDY, G. H., LITTLEWOOD, J. E., AND P6LYA, G. (1934). "Inequalities." Cam- 
bridge Univ. Press. 
KCLLBACK, S. (1959). "Information Theory and Statistics." Wiley, New York. 
LANDSB~RG, P. T. (1961), Entropy and the Unity of Knowledge, Cardiff, University 
of Wales Press. 
SMITH, C. A. B. (1961). Consistency in statistical inference and decision. J. Roy. 
Statist. Soc. B 23, 28 (Discussion). 
TUKEY, J. W. (1960). Conclusions vs. decisions. Technometrics 2, 423-433. 
APPENDIX I 
From (3) we have, first, that 
A(o; o) = ~x(o; 0) + ~(o; o), 
so that 
second that 
so that  
a(0; 0) = 0; 
A(0; 0) = A(0; q) + A(q; 0), 
A(0; q) = -~(q ;  0); 
and third that 
A(p; r) = A(p; 0) + A(0; r) = A(p; 0) -- A(r; 0); 
and the required result follows on writing A(p; 0) = ~o(p). 
APPENDIX I I  
Equation (6) gives 




- -  ~(xy)  = ~(y)  - -  ~(x )  +~(y ' )  - -  ~(x ' ) .  
w(xy) = ~(x) +~(y) ,  
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so that ~(x) = log x (to some base) if ~ is a measurable function, and 
so also if A is (See, for example, Hardy ,  Littlewood, and  Pdlya, 1934, 
p. 96.) 
APPENDIX  III 
F rom (19) we see successively that 
8~(p/s,  q/s)  = ~(p ,  q ) ,  
when s is a positive integer; 
s,,(s'x/s, s 'y/s)  = ~(s'x, s'y), 
= s',,(x, y),  
when s' is a positive integer. Therefore 
~(xx, xy) = x~(x, y), 
when X is a positive rational, and so for all real positive X, since ~ is con- 
tinuous. ( In the argument, x and y must be small enough to bring all 
the arguments into the range 0, 1.) I t  follows that O~/Ox is a function 
of x/y,  so that e is y times a function of x/y,  and this is equivalent o 
the form (20). (Compare, Good, 1960, p. 325.) 
APPENDIX IV 
In Eq. (18), take m = n = 2, and p/  = p j ,  q /  = q i ( J=  1,2) .  
Then let x = ql /p l ,  Y = q2/p~. We find that 
(1 -~ x)(1 -- y)~(x  2) -}- 2(xy -- 1)~(xy) + (1 - x)(1 ~- y)~(y2) 
= 2(x -- y)[~(x) -- ~b(y)]. 
On this identity perform the operation 02/OxOy, and, in the result, put 
x = y. We get 
( z  ~ - 2x  - 1 )¢ ' ( z )  + x~(x 2 - 1)~"(z  ~) + 2¢ ' (x )  = o, 
where here the "pr ime" denotes differentiation. Put x = exp(u), and 
¢'(x)  = f (u )exp( - -u ) ,  and we get 
f (u )  -- f (2u)  + f ' (2u)s inh u = O. 
Differentiate v times, by making use of Leibnitz's formula for the ~th 
derivative of a product, and put u = 0. We find, by induction, that the 
~th derivative of f at the origin vanishes for all positive ,. Hence f is a 
constant, and so ~'(x)  = A/x ,  ¢(x)  = B -q- A log x, as required. 
